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In simplest terms, language is the syn-
tactic combination of concepts (seman-
tics), which are mnemonically addressed
with man-made sensory-based represen-
tations (word-forms). The evolution of
language, therefore, is minimally the evo-
lution of competency for learning the
grammar and words of a given language.
Apes have an ability to learn symbol-
concept associations across several modal-
ities, albeit an impoverished ability. No
conclusive demonstration, however, exists
for grammatical processing in non-human
primates. Grammar, thus, appears to be
the more recent and unique innovation.
(Speech, also unique, is secondary as it
relates to expression and as sign lan-
guage is equally expressive.) Chomsky and
colleagues famously proposed grammat-
ical recursion is “recently evolved and
unique to our species” and that it is
the minimum characteristic of the fac-
ulty of language (Hauser et al., 2002;
Chomsky, 2010). In The Recursive Mind,
Michael Corballis disputes this, arguing
recursion’s incorporation into other cog-
nitive domains antedates its incorporation
into language. Further, he argues the lan-
guage faculty evolved for communication,
not cognition:
I part from Chomsky . . . in his view
that thought itself is fundamentally lin-
guistic. I argue instead that the modes
of thought that made language possible
were nonlinguistic, but were nonethe-
less possessed of recursive properties to
which language adapted . . . This change
of view provides the main stimulus for
this book . . . [It] leads to a better under-
standing of how we . . . think . . . [and]
a radically different perspective on lan-
guage itself, as well as on how it evolved.
(Corballis, under review)
In linguistics, the core application of
recursion is phrase embedding. Chomsky
posits an operation, unbounded Merge,
that recursively merges words to cre-
ate larger phrases. For example, given,
“Jane said Janice thought June was tired
and emotional,” merge would construct
something like: {Jane, {said, {Janice,
{thought, {June, {was, {tired and emo-
tional}}}}}}}. In Chomsky’s view, the
evolution of unbounded Merge is the
genesis of language:
Within some small group from which
we are descended, a rewiring of the
brain took place in some individual,
call him Prometheus, yielding the oper-
ation of unbounded Merge, applying
to concepts with intricate (and little
understood) properties . . . Prometheus’s
language provides him with an infi-
nite array of structured expressions.
(Chomsky, 2010)
Part I of Corballis’ thesis is the ques-
tion of priority: Did recursion evolve
first in a non-linguistic domain? In the
archeological record, technological arti-
facts give evidence for dating the emer-
gence of recursive thought. The acheulian
industry (1.6mya) required a hierarchi-
cal method of production, indicative of
recursion (Vaesen, 2012; Barceló-Coblijn
and Gomila, 2012; Holloway, 2012). While
modern cranial volumes (1.2mya) are
more recent than ascheulian technology,
the archeological record gives no definitive
evidence of the linguistic status of early
hominins. Corballis’ argument therefore
focuses on the behavior of primates, who
clearly lack syntax, for evidence of recur-
sion antedating language. Corballis offers
mental time travel and theory of mind as
examples of non-linguistic domains that
possess recursion and which evolved prior
to the split between the human lineage
and the lineages of our primate cousins.
Unfortunately for Corballis’ argument,
neither mental time travel nor theory of
mind are well established in primates.
Curiously, Corballis concedes the point:
“Evidence . . . indicates that nonhuman
animals, even chimpanzees, are essentially
incapable of theory of mind, mental time
travel, or language—or are at best capable
of these capacities only sporadically, and
only in rudimentary fashion (Corballis,
under review).” Thus, while Corballis
may conjecture recursion’s prior evolution
within non-linguistic domains, at present,
there is no evidence for this. Another prob-
lem for Corballis’ position is that, strictly
speaking, Chomsky’s hypothesis is not that
recursion evolved first within the language
faculty. Rather, his hypothesis is that the
integration of recursion into the precur-
sor language faculty completed the genesis
of the language faculty. Chomsky explic-
itly ponders recursion’s incorporation via
either de novo establishment or annexation
(Chomsky, 2010).
Part II of Corballis’s thesis is the ques-
tion of purpose: Was language initially
selected for its communicative function?
To Chomsky, grammar is language’s essen-
tial quality. It enables the structured,
hierarchical combination of concepts into
statements. It is effectively, if not exactly,
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an engine for symbolic thought. This,
Chomsky posits, was its principal adap-
tive value at genesis. Corballis’ the-
sis implies language’s principal value
at genesis was the ability to trans-
mit non-linguistic thoughts to others,
thoughts already possessed of hierarchical
structure.
Presuming a primarily communica-
tive origin, primacy of recursion in
non-linguistic domains, and the cen-
trality of grammar to language, early
language might have been combinato-
rial but basically non-hierarchical—either
flatly non-hierarchical or at least not
deeply hierarchical. It would have been
limited in the complexity of its statements
but still capable of complex expres-
sion. For instance, “June was tired. June
was emotional. Janice thought it. Jane
said.” Though less compact, less precise,
and reliant on implicature, such expres-
sions succeed, more or less, in con-
veying hierarchically structured concepts.
Notably—and sometimes bitterly contro-
versial among linguists (Bartlett, 2012)—
Daniel Everett has reported existence of
exactly such a language, Pirahã, the lan-
guage of an Amazonian tribe (Everett,
2005, 2012). The recursive nature of Pirahã
is somewhat moot as it is sufficient to ref-
erence the Gedankenexperiment: We can
all imagine a system of communicative
expression that does not have subordinate
clauses and otherwise behaves as Everett
would claim Pirahã does. Clumsy though
it may be, such language would suffice to
provide some additional survival value to
its speakers (or signers).
Chomsky asserts bounded Merge is
an unlikely constituent of the precur-
sor language faculty for reason that
“there is no empirical evidence . . . for
such stipulation”—an apparent dis-
missal of Everett—“and no obvious
rationale . . . since it is still necessary to
assume that at some point unbounded
Merge appears (Chomsky, 2010).” Neither
rebuttal bears much weight, thus we may
conclude both the bounded Merge and
Prometheus scenarios are viable. Finally,
we should ask if it is clear that Corballis
means anything fundamentally different
than recursive symbolic thought with his
notion of non-linguistic recursive thought.
If the objects of his non-linguistic thought
are abstract representations, though not
words—in that the concepts are not refer-
enced by word-forms—that are combined
by computations similar to syntax, at
what point is the linguistic–non-linguistic
distinction only one of emphasis?
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